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1. Introduction 
 
 Strategic and military alliances remain essential tools for projecting regional and 
global power and influence. After the end of the Second World War the United States 
established itself as a military and economic superpower. In an effort to deter aggression 
from the Soviet Union, the United States entered into formal and informal agreements 
with foreign states to preserve and enhance collective defensive capabilities. Such 
alliances are characterized by extensive military and economic collusion meant to enable 
the alliance to carry out its mission, whether it is deterrence, collective defense, or 
foreign intervention. Regardless of the alliance’s purpose, acquisition and transfer of 
military equipment is essential for the duration of the organization’s lifetime. As a result, 
many of the states with which the United States has entered into alliances have 
maintained some mutually agreed upon system for weapon systems acquisition. For most 
of the Cold War, this typically meant that the United States would sell American-made 
weapons systems “off-the-shelf” to allied states for use towards the alliance mission. 
More recently, however, the United States has seemingly begun to move away from this 
strategy of arming allies. Arms agreements between the United States and allies towards 
the end of the Cold War were no longer asymmetric transfers of American produced 
military equipment to allies. Instead, weapons programs became increasingly 
internationalized, distributing design and production across two or more allied states.  
 To what can scholars attribute this recent change in arming strategy? What 
follows is a qualitative exploration of the mechanisms that influence decision making 
within alliances, specifically decisions about developing, producing, and distributing 
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armaments. In security alliances, arms are everything. Arms translate to aggregated 
capabilities for allies and signals of preparedness to potential adversaries. Arms give 
allies teeth to take unilateral action in support of the alliance or give it peace of mind and 
security through acquisition of defensive systems. But because not all alliances are 
created equal, neither are alliance arms policies. In a complex and anarchic international 
system, states must consider the ramifications of every action on every aspect, whether 
strategic, economic, or political, domestic or international. And for a country such as the 
United States, this means having to balance these factors for each one of its several 
alliance commitments. The U.S. is sometimes pejoratively referred to as the world’s 
largest arms dealer. This is due, in no small part, to its interactions with its many allies, 
each with its own unique strategic positioning, economic capacity, and policy agendas. 
My objective here is to shed some light on a topic that has received little direct attention 
by scholars of international relations and hopefully provide some new insight into the 
inner workings of alliance arms policies in a time of ever-changing facts, rules, and 
players. 
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2. Theoretical and Empirical Puzzles 
 
 
This honors thesis will explore two puzzles in contemporary arms acquisition 
within alliances. The latter half of the twentieth century saw a significant increase in the 
number of collective arms acquisition projects between two or more states, henceforth 
referred to as International Arms Cooperation, or IAC.1 This represents a departure from 
the conventional methods of arms acquisition, which were mainly the autonomous 
production of arms within a state or the transfer of fully manufactured arms from one 
state to another. A prime example of IAC has been the decades long Joint Strike Fighter 
project, which has seen the United States join in partnership with several NATO and non-
NATO allies to produce a fifth-generation stealth fighter jet for use by every participating 
state.2 By far the most popular method of acquiring arms and other defense related goods 
has been purchasing preexisting platforms from foreign producers. Examples of this 
method would include a Pentagon approved sale of American-made Lockheed Martin 
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in a deal worth 
$5.4 billion.3 Each of these policies have unique ramifications for the overall 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, I will refer to any collaboration in production/development of arms between the 
U.S. and allied states as international arms cooperation (IAC). Academic literature as well as the 
Department of Defense maintain a general definition of IAC policies. It is generally thought of as including 
“all aspects of defense acquisition programs that are jointly conducted with one or more foreign nations or 
organizations. Facets…include requirements harmonization, RDT&E, production, acquisition, and weapon 
system support.” Furthermore, these programs are formalized via written agreements. This definition is 
taken from Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for International and Commercial Programs, 1996, as 
summarized in a 2002 RAND study, Going Global: U.S. Government Policy and the Defense Aerospace 
Industry. 95.  
2 Lockheed Martin. The Centerpiece of 21st Century Global Security. 2016. https://www.f35.com/global. 
3 Brendan McGarry. 2015. "Saudi Arabia Requests $5.4 Billion Worth of PAC-3 Missiles." DoD Buzz, 
July. 
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functionality and cohesiveness of an alliance. More importantly, each policy is derived 
from different theoretical assumptions about how the international system functions.  
The first puzzle this paper will explore is: why has there been a rise in 
international arms cooperation in recent decades? Classical realist theory consists of four 
basic assumptions, that (1) states are the central actors in international politics, (2) the 
international system is inherently anarchic, (3) all actors are rational, and (4) all states 
desire power above all else as a means to ensure their self-preservation.4 Realist thinkers 
as far back as Machiavelli have argued strongly against the reliance upon other states for 
security, instead arguing for the self-sufficient production of all means of military 
power.5 Realist and neorealist ideas have had significant influence on American foreign 
policy debate since the early twentieth century and have included such proponents as 
Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and George H.W. Bush.6 Considering the amount of 
influence realism has had on both American debate and policy throughout the twentieth 
century, the sudden departure in recent decades is puzzling. That realist doctrine stresses 
an autarkic approach to security is well established and has been followed by U.S. policy 
for most of its history. Indeed, even in Western countries where markets have been 
opened to free trade, defense industries have remained protected, in line with these states’ 
strong preference for self-sufficient arms production over reliance on foreign suppliers.7 
Why, then, the sudden rise in IAC? Do states no longer believe autarkic defense 
                                                 
4 Robert E. Goodin, (2010). The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. p. 133. 
5 Niccolo Machiavelli. 1515. The Prince. Translated by W.K. Marriott. New York: Chios Classics. 
6 Kyle M. Lascurettes. "Realism (International Relations)." policy 66 (2002): 878-881. 
7 Richard A. Bitzinger. "The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge." 
International Security (The MIT Press) 19, no. 2 (1994): 172. 
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production to be integral to their national security or have they engaged in new methods 
of defense acquisition based on a new calculus of international security?  
The second puzzling aspect of the rise of IAC is that it has not occurred uniformly 
across U.S. alliances. That is, while the U.S. has expanded IAC projects with allies and 
partners in recent years, this transformation of defense acquisition has not significantly 
reduced the number of traditional arms agreements in which the U.S. sells existing 
weapons systems to foreign allies.8 The U.S. is party to several collective defense 
agreements with foreign states. Aside from NATO, these agreements include Australia, 
the Philippines, Thailand, and Brazil.9 The largest IAC project, the F-35, does not include 
all of these states.10 If U.S. policy has moved away from self-sufficient defense 
production, why have we not seen the IAC in all new cases of weapons system 
acquisition? Why are some states offered opportunities for IAC with the U.S. via licensed 
production, coproduction, and codevelopment? 
Post-Cold War U.S. arms agreements with allies have varied between 
international arms cooperation and the traditional sale of conventional arms to foreign 
governments, which remains high today. This paper will explore the underlying causes of 
this variance in arms arrangements via a focused study of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
and evaluate the implications that it has for the future of the arms industry, alliances, and 
international security.  
 
                                                 
8 Time. 2015. "The U.S. Is Still No.1 at Selling Arms to the World." December. 
9 U.S. State Department. n.d. U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements. state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/. 
This list is limited to official agreements of collective defense and does not list all states with which the 
U.S. conducts arms sales.  
10 Lockheed Martin. The Centerpiece of 21st Century Global Security. 2016. https://www.f35.com/global. 
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3. Literature Review 
  
This is an area of international relations scholarship that is lacking in substantive 
analysis of the subject of international arms cooperation. However, the existing literature 
does an adequate job of explaining the logic behind different approaches to IAC with 
respect to each major school of international relations theory. Yet most scholarly 
arguments suggest a one-size-fits-all theory for alliance arms procurement, whether it is 
founded in realism or liberalism. That is, they too often assume that U.S. arms policies 
should be identical across all cases. The puzzle is that, in practice, U.S. policy towards 
alliance defense production is remarkably inconsistent and no one theory can explain this 
variation in policies from alliance to alliance. Therefore, it is necessary to delve deeper 
into the makeup of various American alliance systems in order to understand the other 
underlying factors that are influencing U.S. decision-making. 
Classical realist and neorealist literature embraces security alliances as an 
essential component of the international system.11 More specifically, balance-of-power 
theory within realism asserts that states are motivated to form alliances when they are 
threatened by a rising power with greater resources or military capacity.12 Stephen Walt 
suggests this represents one of two theories that explain alliance formation. The first, 
called “balancing,” takes a traditional realist view that states will form allances when 
                                                 
11 Carl von Clausewitz. On War. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1832. 
12 Stephen M. Walt. "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning." In International Politics: Enduring 
Concepts and Contemporary Issues, by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, 110. New York: Pearson/Longman, 
2005. 
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faced with a common external threat. In a world where balancing is the dominant 
behavior, states are more secure because aggressive behavior is deterred. However, 
according to the second hypothesis, called “bandwagoning,” states are motivated to allign 
with the more threatening state in order to avoid being conquered. In a world where 
bandwagoning is the dominant behavior, states are less secure because weaker states will 
allign themselves with the stronger power, thus encouraging aggressive behavior.13 
Applied to alliance weapons acquisition, realists would be hesitent to embrace a shared, 
or international approach to arms procurement because of the security concerns inherent 
within the balance or power theory.14 Realists consider all security alliances to be 
circumstantial, and thus temporary.15 Sharing sensitive defense technology with other 
states would be unwise if states readily shift their allegiances over time or as a result of 
changing circumstances. To circumvent this risk altogether, realism suggests maintaining 
an autonomous defense industry regardless of circumstance, as it provides states with the 
greatest security in terms of military readiness.16 Other key works on alliance pathologies 
address trade-offs states face in the pursuit of security as well as the general factors that 
lead states to cooperate on a mulititude of issues outside of defense.17 
                                                 
13 Ibid, 113.  
14 For an alternate game theoretic approach to balance-of-power theory, see Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and 
David Lalman. "International Power Relations and War." In War and Reason: Domestic and International 
Imperatives, 181-218. Yale University Press, 1992.  
15 For a discussion of alliances and security tradeoffs, see Sorokin, Gerald L. "Arms, Alliances, and 
Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries." International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1994): 421-46. 
16 Richard A. Bitzinger. "The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge." 
International Security (The MIT Press) 19, no. 2 (1994): 170-198. 
17 For analysis of tradeoffs of security alliances see Morrow, James D. "Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in 
the Search for Security." International Organization 47, no. 2 (1993): 207-33. For general discussion of 
international collaboration see Haas, Ernst B. "Why Collaborate?: Issue-Linkage and International 
Regimes." World Politics 32, no. 3 (1980): 357-405. 
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Literature dealing specifically with the changing global arms industry began to 
appear in the early and mid 1990s, likely in response to end of the Cold War and the 
bipolar international structure. In the U.S. this period was characterized by falling 
defense budgets and excess industrial capacity within the defense industry.18 At the same 
time, the number of IAC projects between states was on the rise. While some of the 
scholarship on the globalization of the defense industry is particularly enlightening, 
substantive literature on this topic is sparse. Indeed, much of the literature on the subject 
that appeared in the 1990s is limited only to the discussion of traditional arms transfers as 
opposed to cooperative arms development. The same is true of records and data of the 
global arms industry compiled by governments and other organizations.19 Nonetheless, 
the literature of conventional arms sales detail important international security 
implications.  
Richard Bitzinger is one of the first scholars to conduct an in depth investigation 
into this phenomenon. Until the final decades of the twentieth century, international 
collaboration in weapons systems was done on an ad hoc basis, seldom laid out in detail 
through formalized agreements.20 Bitzinger cites a number of factors contributing to the 
                                                 
18 Eugene Gholz, and Harvey M. Sapolsky. "Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry." International 
Security 24, no. 3 (1999): 5-51. 
19 The U.S. State Department keeps annual records of global interstate arms transfers via World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT). Only statistics of traditional measures of arms sales such as 
exports and imports are recorded, along with some licensed production. As a result, it is not a useful source 
for IAC projects. No contemporary database of IAC (licensed, coproduced, codeveloped, or otherwise) 
exists. Richard Bitzinger briefly oversaw the development of a globalized defense project database under 
the Defense Budget Project (DBP) but it was eventually discontinued after the DBP’s incorporation into the 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. As a result, the database only included IAC projects in 
development until 1995.   
20 Richard A. Bitzinger. "The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge." 
International Security (The MIT Press) 19, no. 2 (1994): 170. 
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increased globalization of the defense industry, including the end of the Cold War and 
rising costs of development of new sophisticated, techonologically advanced weaponry.21 
In response to these factors, he argues that states elect to cooperate on arms production to 
achieve economic efficiences by (1) sharing research and development costs; (2) gaining 
access to innovative foreign technologies; (3) achieving economies of scale in defense 
production; and (4) breaking into foreign markets.22 In the past the dominant method of 
globalized defense production was through licesnsed production in which sell the rights 
to reproduce exisiting weapons systems, such as the F-104 fighter.23 More recently 
defense production has taken other forms such as coproduction, in which a weapon 
system produced in a single country is manufactured in foreign states, and 
codevelopment, in which two or more states share costs throughout the entire research 
and development process.24 While the U.S. sees various cost saving benefits from IAC 
there are also potential risks involved with the internationalization of the arms industry. 
The diffusion of advanced military technology into the global arms market may dampen 
the military-technological advantages of the West. In addition, the globalized arms 
industry has helped to revive the defense industries of some developing countries, 
allowing them to now become arms exporters, further flooding the world with 
conventional arms.25  
                                                 
21 Ibid.  
22 Richard A. Bitzinger. "The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge." 
International Security (The MIT Press) 19, no. 2 (1994): 174-175. 
23 Ibid, 177. 
24 Ibid, 177. 
25 Ibid, 190-191. 
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Some scholars maintain the belief that self-sufficient defense production remains 
a better option over IAC. Ethan Kapstein argues that IAC is a “second-best solution” to 
the issue of arms acquisition because it ultimately represents a new form of 
protectionism.26 Again Kapstein, like many scholars, subscribe to the realist outlook on 
defense production in that states will always have a preference for autonomous defense 
production. He analyzes the makeup of the global arms market and develops a matrix of 
possible state arms acquisition strategies based on two factors, technological assets and 
financial assets.27 According to this method of analysis, only states with both financial 
and technological assets will be able to sustain autarkic defense industries; states with 
only technological assets will codevelop arms; states with only financial assets will 
coproduce arms; and states with neither technological nor financial assets will import all 
defense-related goods.28 Codevelopment and coproduction are “second-best solutions” 
because they replace the pure free market outcomes of the defense industry. Furthermore, 
collaborative defense projects on the part of U.S. policymakers are proposed as a means 
to retain foreign market influence, especially in Europe, where defense industries have 
become advanced enough to compete with American firms.29 The other problem with 
IAC projects, according to Kapstein, is that state-level commitment and division of costs 
and labors significantly delays projects by years, which adds more time for other 
variables such as state strategy and firm capacities to change to the point where the 
                                                 
26 Ethan Barnaby Kapstein. "International Collaboration in Armaments Production: A Second-Best 
Solution." Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 4 (1991): 657-75. 
27 Ibid, 659. 
28 Ibid, 659-660. 
29 Ibid. 659-670. 
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project loses support.30 Kapstein concludes by arguing that because the U.S. has such 
significant comparative advantages in the arms market, American policymakers should 
not give in to pressure to enter into IAC projects, which could exacerbate the 
proliferation of advanced conventional weaponry around the world.31 
Critics of Kapstein’s argument would point out that, in an open global economy, 
the opportunity costs of autonomous defense production are greater than the benefits of 
supply-side security. To this point, Jonathan Caverley argues that states do not 
necessarily have to make a choice between security and technological competitiveness 
and that large states like the U.S. benefit from the market influence gained from defense 
industry openness.32 The domination of the defense market by American firms is what 
makes this possible. The lopsidedness of U.S. market power, Caverley argues, “has a 
pacifying effect…because it extends U.S. power more cheaply than conquest.”33 As more 
and more states become dependent on American firms for their defense-related goods, the 
more difficult it will be for states to counterbalance against the U.S, as they would most 
certainly face supply cutoffs.34  
Stephen Brooks is one of the few scholars to focus specifically on IAC arms 
acquisition and puts forward the argument that globalization of the defense industry 
increases economic integration and interdependence, making conflict less likely. In 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 660-651 
31 Ibid, 674-675. For a detailed analysis of diffusion of technology, see Keith Krause. "The Political 
Economy of the International Arms Transfer System: The Diffusion of Military Technique via Arms 
Transfers." International Journal 45, no. 3 (1990): 687-722. 
32 Jonathan D. Caverley. "United States Hegemony and the New Economics of Defense." Security Studies 
(Taylor and Francis Group, LLC) 16, no. 4 (2007): 598-614. 
33 Caverley 2007, 599 
34 Caverley 2007, 611 
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addition, the U.S. defense industry benefited from the access to new technological 
innovations as a result of increased international cooperation. He concludes that the 
benefits of a globalized arms industry to the U.S. are so massive in terms of reducing 
costs, gaining technology, and achieving economies of scale, that it would be unlikely for 
the U.S. to attempt to restrict foreign influence via protectionist policies.35 Instead, the 
U.S. will continue to take advantage of the benefits of a globalized defense industry in 
order to address falling domestic investment in defense.36  
Works that present an in-depth analysis of the growing trend of globalization of 
the arms industry are rare across the existing literature, as it reflects a very recent trend in 
international relations. Most works address the arms industry through the lens of 
traditional arms transfers without paying close attention to the recent rise in more 
collaborative IAC projects. However, they serve to provide insightful implications for 
how scholars might think about the effects of a changing global arms industry. David 
Kinsella analyzes the effect that arms transfer dependence has on states’ tendencies to 
instigate armed conflict. He theorizes and proves that when states lacking indigenous 
defense industries become dependent on one or two foreign powers for defense-related 
goods, they are more cautious when taking action that may signal aggression. This is 
because their reliance on a single, or even two, states for security leaves them vulnerable 
to supply cutoffs via embargoes or other sanctions.37 This is just one of a plethora of 
works examining the ability of large, industrialized states to project power and leverage 
                                                 
35 Brooks 2005, 126-129. 
36 Ibid. 
37 David Kinsella. "Arms Transfer Dependence and Foreign Policy Conflict." Journal of Peace Research 
(Sage Publications, Ltd) 35, no. 1 (January 1998): 7-23. 
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influence over smaller states through the provision of arms. James Morrow writes that 
strong powers forge alliances with small states in order to gain benefits such as military 
bases or greater control over the state’s policies.38 Small states are willing to make such 
concessions because they prefer the benefits of security that the large state provides over 
the maintenance of sovereignty. Also worth noting, however, is the extent to which small 
states in asymmetric alliances are able to influence the policies of their more powerful 
counterparts. Robert Keohane details how U.S. foreign policy provides leverage to small 
allies, as concessions such as bases and naval rights are necessities for American 
operations.39 While not a substantial part of the literature, it does lay the foundation for 
understanding the preferences of weak allies and how they might go about seeking them.  
As the world’s defense industry continues to globalize and IAC projects continue 
to produce joint weapons systems, the literature will expand to encompass new realities 
in the international system. This is evident through a number of works on the subject 
published in more recent years, which expands into a new dimension of arms transfers; 
that of “socially responsible arms transfers.” For example, Jennifer Erickson writes in her 
book, Dangerous Trade, that states sign onto responsible arms trade initiatives even 
though they provide no tangible gains and instead often impose strict costs on arms 
exports. They do so out of concern for reputation among the international community that 
may provide later benefits as well as a confirmation of a particular state’s inherent 
                                                 
38 James D. Morrow. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of 
Alliances." American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (November 1991): 904-933. 
39 Robert O. Keohane. "The Big Influence of Small Allies." Foreign Policy, no. 2 (1971): 161-82. 
  18 
ideological values domestically.40 This may also explain instances of strict regulation of 
dual-use technology exports.41 
 While literature regarding specific instances of international arms collaboration is 
limited, there are some sources worth mentioning. A 1989 paper published by the director 
of business development of General Dynamics outlined the successes of the company’s 
F-16 fighter jet, which is often cited as the first major instance of international 
collaboration in heavy armaments. The short evaluation concluded that the F-16 
ultimately proved to be a successful international endeavor because of clearly defined 
minimum purchase commitments by participating countries and because of economic 
incentives offered via direct and indirect offsets.42 There is also limited study of the most 
recent international arms program, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. In 2012, series of articles 
published in the International Journal provided an extensive analysis of the political 
underpinnings of the program’s design and execution. These studies conclude that the F-
35’s persistent design flaws and cost increases exacerbated already fragile commitments 
within the partner states, leading to a politically toxic environment for the project and 
international collaboration in particular.43 
                                                 
40 Jennifer L. Erickson. "“Responsible” Arms Transfer Policy and the Politics of Social Reputation." 
In Dangerous Trade: Arms Exports, Human Rights, and International Reputation, 16-43. Columbia 
University Press, 2015. 
41 For a history of European regulation of dual-use technology, see Ian Davis (2002) The Regulation of 
Arms and Dual-Use Exports. New York: Oxford University Press. 
42 Robert H. Trice. 1989. "International Cooperation in Military Aircraft Programs." The DISAM Journal 
75. 
43 Srdjan Vucetic and Kim Richard Nossal. "The International Politics of the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter." International Journal 68, no. 1 (2012): 3-12.  
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These studies aside, the general literature remains relatively unresponsive to the 
increasingly international process of arms production. And works that do explore this 
topic are often limited to a discussion of the effects of globalized arms production and 
agreements rather than the causes. Furthermore, these works do very little to address the 
variance in arming policies between alliances. In this paper, I will attempt to contribute to 
a small but growing subfield of arms acquisition geopolitics and economics in security 
alliances.  
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4. Dependent Variable: Alliance Arming Policy 
 
The dependent variable of this study is the arms acquisition policy pursued within 
security alliances. U.S. alliance arming policies can be divided into two general 
categories – arms transfers and international arms cooperation (IAC). Arms transfers 
involve the sale of preexisting weapons systems from one state to another.44 When 
armaments are purchased directly from the exporting state, the importing state does not 
contribute to any phase of development or production. The purchasing state does not 
contribute to any phases of development and merely purchases weapons systems “off the 
shelf.”45 For example, in 2015 the U.S. and India signed an agreement to authorize the 
sale of pre-existing, American manufactured Apache and Chinook helicopters to the 
Indian military.46  
In contrast to direct purchases is international arms cooperation. IAC differs from 
direct arms transfers as both allies contribute to the development or production of a 
weapons system to varying degrees.47 For example, the development of the AV-8B 
Harrier II fighter jet, which brought together the American firm McDonnell Douglass and 
                                                 
44 While there are other possibilities such as licensed production and coproduction, they can be grouped 
into one of two preceding groups. There are many forms of joint development. Stephen Brooks further 
divides collaborative projects based on the level of responsibility allocated to the recipient state. They 
include licensed production, where receiving states are granted rights to reproduce existing weapons 
systems, coproduction, where receiving states are included in the joint manufacture of weapons systems, 
usually for economic reasons, and codevelopment, where multiple firms from multiple participating states 
collaborate on a weapons system throughout the entire value chain. For research simplicity I will regard 
licensed production, coproduction, and codevelopment as, together, composing international cooperative 
arming policy.  
45 Charles H. Anderton. 1995. Economics of Arms Trade. Vol. 1, in Handbook of Defense Economics. 524-
558. 
46 The Times of India. "India Inks $3.1 Billion Deals for Apache and Chinook Helicopters." September 28, 
2015. 
47 Brooks 2005, 82-83. 
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British Aerospace and Rolls-Royce.48 The F-16 fighter jet was also an intensive 
international collaboration between partner countries that emphasized the use of 
economic incentives to get foreign governments to commit to the project.49 In sum, I am 
interested in determining what factors lead states to open their previously indigenous 
defense projects to foreign participation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 
49 See Robert H. Trice. 1989. "International Cooperation in Military Aircraft Programs." The DISAM 
Journal 69-76. 
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5. Independent Variables and Hypotheses 
 
Under what conditions will states engage in IAC projects while others remain 
forced to import pre-assembled weapons platforms? 
My first independent variable is change in alliances’ collective defense budgets 
over time. Defense budgets reflect the annual funds a given country allocates towards 
national defense and can encompass a variety of aspects such as research, development, 
production, and maintenance.50 The primary function of a security alliance is to provide 
each member state with credible deterrence towards potential aggressors via aggregate 
military capabilities.51 Potential adversaries are deterred from attacking a member state 
knowing that they would then face the combined strength of the alliance.52 Such an 
alliance maintains credibility as long as the aggregate military power of the member 
states is strong enough to match that of a hostile state(s).53 One measure of military 
power is weapons technology, which can be compared side by side with adversaries.54 
States invest in the latest defense technology in order to maintain credible deterrence, 
thus keeping the alliance functional. Alliances are able to acquire such weapons systems 
through collective investment in the alliance. This is most frequently done through states’ 
defense budgets. 
                                                 
50 Gordon Adams and Stephen Alexis Cain. "Defense Dilemmas in the 1990s." International Security 13, 
no. 4 (1989): 8. 
51 See Stephen M. Walt 2005 
52 Glenn Palmer. "Alliance Politics and Issue Areas: Determinants of Defense Spending." American 
Journal of Political Science 34, no. 1 (1990): 191. 
53 Ibid. 
54 James D. Morrow. 1991. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation 
Model of Alliances." American Journal of Political Science 35 (4): 904-905. 
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Defense appropriations are influenced by factors such as geopolitical environment 
and public opinion.55 Increasing threats posed by rival states increases the need for 
security, which is usually reflected in an increase in state military spending. The same is 
true for security alliances, just on a larger scale. Member states pool together their 
military resources to form an aggregate deterrent. As a result, it seems reasonable to 
expect fluctuations in a state’s defense budget over time to contribute to changes in 
policy preferences when it comes to arms procurement.  
Conventional wisdom rooted in realist theory tells us that state defense allocations 
maintain a positive relationship with threat level. As threat of armed interstate conflict 
rises, so do defense budgets, and vice-versa.56 In addition, larger states tend to have larger 
defense budgets, which allow more defense-related purchases.57 The continued 
purchasing of military hardware provides domestic suppliers with a stable consumer base. 
As long as the domestic government maintains large defense budgets, domestic defense 
firms will sustain themselves with government contracts, which can provide for longer 
supply runs.58  
                                                 
55 See Richard C. Eichenberg and Richard Stoll “Representing Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense 
Budget in the United States and Western Europe.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, (2003): 47: 399-422 and; 
Larry M. Bartels. "The American Public's Defense Spending Preferences in the Post-Cold War Era." The 
Public Opinion Quarterly 58, no. 4 (1994): 479-508. 
56 See Glenn Palmer. "Alliance Politics and Issue Areas: Determinants of Defense Spending." American 
Journal of Political Science 34, no. 1 (1990): 190-211 and William Nordhaus John R. Oneal, and Bruce 
Russett. "The Effects of the International Security Environment on National Military Expenditures: A 
Multicountry Study." International Organization 66, no. 3 (2012): 491-513. 
57 Glenn Palmer. "Alliance Politics and Issue Areas: Determinants of Defense Spending." American 
Journal of Political Science 34, no. 1 (1990): 199-200. 
58 See Jonathan Caverley and Ethan B. Kapstein. "Arms Away: How Washington Squandered Its 
Monopoly on Weapons Sales." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 5 (2012): 125-32. 
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Longer supply runs are especially tied to government contracts for technologically 
sophisticated weapons systems, such as aircraft.59 These arms often require massive 
upfront costs in research and development.60 In periods when perceived threat is high, 
large states are willing to invest the necessary financial assets into the defense industry, 
increasing defense budgets. However, when defense budgets decrease, there are less 
funds available for technology-heavy armaments, making it difficult for firms to maintain 
the economies of scale necessary for the production of such goods.61 In addition, per unit 
costs of arms are driven up as the number of units produced begins to fall in response to 
decreased demand.62  
Shrinking defense budgets and the increased initial costs associated with cutting-
edge weapons systems creates an incentive for states to find ways to reduce the cost of 
acquiring arms. Since states in alliances share common geopolitical and strategic 
interests, it makes sense to move toward a more integrated approach to arms acquisition. 
There are several advantages to international arms cooperation. First, it allows states 
within an alliance to share the burden of heavy upfront costs of investing in research and 
development, thus reducing financial risk for governments. Second, collaboration 
increases the market for these arms, as it is no longer dependent on the domestic demand 
of one state. The increased consumer base helps to reduce per unit costs by producing 
                                                 
59 See Marc R. DeVore & Moritz Weiss (2014) “Who's in the cockpit? The political economy of 
collaborative aircraft decisions.” Review of International Political Economy, 21:2, 497-533.  
60 Ethan B. Kapstein. "International Collaboration in Armaments Production: A Second-Best 
Solution." Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 4 (1991): 668. 
61 Jonathan Caverley and Ethan B. Kapstein. "Arms Away: How Washington Squandered Its Monopoly on 
Weapons Sales." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 5 (2012): 125-32. 
62 Ibid, 127. 
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more units, making it easier to achieve and maintain economies of scale.63 Finally, 
collaboration on defense projects encourages alliance cohesion through increased 
interoperability of forces.64 As a result, we should expect international arms cooperation 
to a practical alternative to the preferred method of autarkic arms production given 
decreased budgets and increased costs. This is summarized in the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Decreases in defense spending across member states of a security alliance 
leads to an increase in IAC defense projects.  
 
  
 While alliances see decreases in their aggregate defense spending, reductions 
typically not uniform across every member state. This is especially true in asymmetric 
alliances, where few or even a single state continue to account for most of the group’s 
military spending. As a result, within asymmetric alliances, the alliance “hegemon” or 
leader maintains significant clout in determining how arms are acquired, even in times of 
austerity. However, the preferences of alliance members, including the small states, 
remain the same – states want to preserve as much autonomy as possible. Given that 
completely indigenous arms production is unfeasible, small states in an asymmetric 
alliance will push for collaborative arms programs in order to benefit from economic 
offsets that provide access to advanced technology and stimulation of indigenous defense 
industries. The hegemonic leader of an alliance, still preferring to export its domestically 
                                                 
63 Brooks 2005, 83. 
64 Ethan B. Kapstein. "International Collaboration in Armaments Production: A Second-Best 
Solution." Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 4 (1991): 668. 
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produced arms to its allies, will be more likely to turn to collaboration if its defense 
budget falls below its ability to support the increased costs of producing wholly 
indigenous advanced weapons systems. This leads me to my second hypothesis: 
 
H2: International arms collaboration is a response to the high costs of 
technological inputs for advanced weapons systems.  
 
 
Another factor that has increasingly affected the global arms market has been the 
diffusion of advanced technology. The 1970s and 1980s saw increased 
internationalization of the global arms industry, causing a widespread diffusion of dual-
use technologies that helped to jumpstart defense production capacity in states that had 
previously been primary importers of foreign-made weapons systems.65 Though defense 
industries had been slow to internationalize, civilian producers of advanced technological 
inputs in industries such as aerospace, microelectronics, computer software, and 
telecommunications, where now taking the lead in developing cutting-edge dual-use 
technologies. Because firms that produced these inputs were part of complex global 
supply chains, industrial expertise and capacity quickly diffused to more states, including 
many that had previously been significant importers of arms.66 By the late 1980s the 
internationalization of dual-use technologies was the subject of several U.S. government 
studies that found there was significant reliance on foreign sources for many of the 
military’s most advanced weapons systems, which alarmed holders of more traditional 
                                                 
65 David Kinsella. 1999. "Arms Production in the Third Tier: An Analysis of Opportunity and Willingness." 
International Interactions 26 (3): 253-286. 
66 Brooks 2005, 84-85. 
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realist views.67 What did this development mean for U.S. post-Cold War strategy? If the 
United States was facing both decreased defense budgets and increased foreign 
competition, then the risk of losing global arms market influence seemed plausible, even 
among allied states, who were now in a position to take a realist approach and increase 
defense industry autonomy. As a result, a U.S. alliance arming strategy based on off-the-
shelf exports would no longer be feasible, as former arms importers now had a legitimate 
and indigenous alternative to American weaponry. U.S. allies could use this newfound 
military industrial capacity to leverage coproduction and codevelopment agreements with 
generous economic and technological offsets to further bolster their industries. This 
relationship between allies is summarized in the following two hypotheses:  
 
H3: Small states in an asymmetric alliance prefer to collaborate on arms because 
of access to new technology and stimulation of domestic industrial base. 
 
H4: Large states will agree to collaborate with small states if its defense budget is 
low and foreign competition is high.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 See Roderick Vawter. 1986. U.S. Industrial Base Dependence/Vulnerability, Phase 1: Survey of 
Literature. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University. 4; Department of Defense (DoD). 1988. 
Bolstering Defense Industrial Competitiveness: Preserving Our Heritage, Securing Our Future. 
Washington, D.C.: Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition), 
July. 155-157, 192. 
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6. Research Design 
 
 
 Because defense industry globalization is such a recent development in 
international relations, substantive data on the subject is extremely limited. As a result, I 
will be utilizing a mixed method approach to testing my hypotheses. Where available, I 
will make use of existing data on conventional arms transfers and international arms 
cooperation.68 However, the majority of this paper will be a qualitative analysis of the 
largest collaborative arms program to date—the Joint Strike Fighter. This case is selected 
intentionally because of the project’s anomalous nature in international relations. In other 
words, the case is deviant from the majority of cases in the universe of U.S. arms 
production up until this point, which show that realist concern for autonomy has makes it 
irrational for an advanced industrial state to risk losing defense industrial capabilities 
through collaboration with allies, even if such collaboration may strengthen the alliance 
in the long run.69  
 The time period covered by this research is from 1991 to 2015. I emphasize the 
post-Cold War era as this time period best captures the scope of the initial research 
puzzle. This is because (1) the radical changes in Western grand strategy resulting from 
                                                 
68 There is a wealth of data available on annual arms transfers from one state to another. The U.S. 
Department of State maintains such publically available data via the World Military Expenditures and 
Arms Transfers (WMEAT) database. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) also 
keeps data on arms transfers and some licensed production measured in Trend Indicator Value (TIV). 
Meanwhile, substantive data on other means of IAC (coproduction and codevelopment) is virtually 
nonexistent. The most extensive dataset covering IAC is a database developed by Richard Bitzinger as part 
of the Defense Budget Project (DBP). The database contains information on hundreds of internationally 
produced, developed, and planned weapons systems, but covers cases only through 1995.  
69 Phillip Taylor. "Weapons Standardization in NATO: Collaborative Security or Economic 
Competition?" International Organization 36, no. 1 (1982): 97-98. 
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the collapse of the U.S.S.R, (2) the across-the-board cuts to global defense budgets 
following this event, and (3) the culmination of the technology revolution, which had 
begun to change the nature of arms production in the mid-twentieth century and now was 
a critical factor in future acquisitions.70  
The total universe of cases encompasses all U.S. to ally arms agreements 
involving the direct transfer, licensed production, coproduction, or codevelopment of 
combat aircraft-type weapons systems. The scope of this study will be limited to IAC 
agreements involving the United States because the U.S. represents the least likely case 
for significant IAC projects because the country’s vast economic power and size puts it in 
the best position to remain self-sufficient in defense production.71 I will limit my analysis 
to only combat aircraft because (1) there is more data available for these types of 
weapons systems than others (small arms, for example) and (2) aircraft are platforms that 
feature more technologically advanced inputs and therefore inflict greater costs for 
purchasing states. Existing data on IAC tells us that there were thirty-three cases of 
codeveloped aircraft from 1991 to 1995, twelve cases of coproduced aircraft, and twenty-
six cases of licensed production.72 Of course, this does not account for the many cases of 
IAC that were initiated after 1995. A major contribution of this study will be to expand 
                                                 
70 See Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky. "Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry." International 
Security 24, no. 3 (1999): 5-51; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, After the Cold War: 
Living with Lower Defense Spending, OTA-ITE-524 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
February 1992); and David Kinsella. 1999. "Arms Production in the Third Tier: An Analysis of 
Opportunity and Willingness." International Interactions 26 (3): 253-286. 
71 Brooks 2005, 80. 
72 Richard A. Bitzinger, DBP Globalization Database. 
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upon the globalized weaponry database created by Richard Bitzinger in the early 1990s 
for the Defense Budget Project.   
 The structure of this case study is exploratory and because the Joint Strike Fighter 
case is considered deviant, any subsequent proposed model of explanation may not 
necessarily be applied to other cases.73 The purpose of this study is to develop a 
proposition based upon close examination of one particular case in an attempt to explain 
its existence better than do existing frameworks. The structure of this case study is 
theory-guided and interpretive.74 Ultimately, while the evidence compiled and 
conclusions drawn as a result of this case study alone are insufficient to construct a 
challenging theory, it will highlight a significant gap in neorealist theories of 
international politics.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 Jason Seawright and John Gerring. 2008. "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu 
of Qualitative and Quantitative Options." Political Research Quarterly (University of Utah) 61 (2): 302-
303 
74 Jack S. Levy. 2008. "Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference." Conflict Management and 
Peace Science 25: 4. 
75 Levy cautions against basing new theories on case studies alone. Theory is “a logically interconnected set 
of propositions” and thus “requires a more deductive orientation than case studies provide.”  
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7. Data and Analysis  
  
Realist theory asserts that states always prefer autonomous defense production 
over reliance on foreign sources. In practice, however, very few states are able to develop 
sustainable indigenous defense industries. This has been especially true since the mid-
twentieth century, which has been described as a period of rapid technological 
revolution.76 This spread of advanced military technology has been accelerated by the 
rapid pace of globalization of the defense industry during the same time period.77 The 
proliferation of engineering expertise and other intangible assets to “third tier” states has 
made it possible for more countries to achieve and maintain a minimum level of defense 
industrial capacity.78 Evolution of indigenous arms production develops in third tier states 
in five steps:79 
1. Assembly of imported arms 
2. Production of weapons components under license  
3. Production of complete weapons systems under license 
4. Modification, redesign, or reproduction of foreign weapons systems 
5. Production of indigenously designed weapons systems 
 
 
The ability of states to successfully produce weapons components or even entire 
weapons systems on their own is crucial in IAC, as it presupposes a minimum industrial 
base necessary for allied cooperation. While state industrial capacity is somewhat 
                                                 
76 Keith Krause. "The Political Economy of the International Arms Transfer System: The Diffusion of 
Military Technique via Arms Transfers." International Journal 45, no. 3 (1990): 689. 
77 See Brooks 2005 and  
78 David Kinsella. 1999. "Arms Production in the Third Tier: An Analysis of Opportunity and Willingness." 
International Interactions 26 (3): 261. 
79 Andrew L. Ross. (1994). "Developing Countries." In Andrew J. Pierre (ed.), Cascade of Arms: Managing 
Conventional Weapons Proliferation, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press 
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difficult to quantify, Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) provides us with 
tangible measures. Table 6.1 lists seventeen U.S. allies and partner states by national 
material capability according to 1991 CINC scores.80  
 
Table 7.1 Selected U.S. Allies and Partners  
by CINC 1991 
 
State CINC 
India 0.0613275 
Japan 0.059807 
Germany 0.0328156 
United Kingdom 0.0264498 
France 0.0234724 
South Korea 0.0218287 
Italy 0.0212774 
Turkey 0.0139737 
Saudi Arabia 0.0126078 
Canada 0.0123652 
Spain 0.0122554 
Netherlands 0.0073363 
Belgium 0.006281 
Israel 0.0029186 
Australia 0.0028072 
Norway 0.0019046 
Denmark 0.0015962 
 
                                                 
80 J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and 
Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-
48; Singer, J. David. 1987. "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of 
States, 1816-1985" International Interactions, 14: 115-32. 
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CINC composite scores measure national capabilities based on factors such as 
population, military spending, and iron and steel production. If my hypothesis is correct, 
we should expect to see international arms cooperation between the U.S. and allies with 
higher CINC values, which indicate a greater capacity to contribute to the technologically 
intensive production of advanced weaponry. An initial bivariate regression of preceding 
CINC values and the total number of aircraft weapon systems produced under license 
from the United States between 1991 and 2015 yields a statistically significant 
relationship (P > |t| = 0.027) between national material capability and licensed production 
of weapons systems. This relationship is depicted by the scatterplot in Figure 8.1. 
However, it is important to note that more quantitative analysis is needed to explore this 
trend. My analysis in this paper is limited by the lack of existing data on the subject.  
Figure 7.1 
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Falling Defense Budgets 
 
 While significant, the arms transfer numbers do not tell the entire story. For 
context, we must examine the overall trend of NATO spending as the Cold War drew to a 
close. Given the theoretical foundations laid out in the literature review section of this 
paper, we should expect the individual defense budgets of NATO members, and by 
extension NATO as a whole, to decrease in response to diminished threat from the Soviet 
Union. This assumption is supported by military spending data collected by the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Table 7.2 shows aggregate 
NATO spending between 1988 and 1997. As the data shows, NATO spending in the late 
1980s is high at $918.8 billion but then steadily declines into the 1990s, coinciding with 
the collapse of the USSR and reorganization of Eastern Europe, until it reaches a low 
point in 1998 at $691.3 billion. This difference of over $200 billion over a short period 
carried serious repercussions for the alliance’s ability to acquire new weapons systems.  
 This stark decline in NATO military spending is further highlighted in Figure 7.2, 
which clearly shows rapid decline, especially from 1992 to 1996. Spending rises sharply 
again after 2001 and by 2004 approaches the levels of the late 1980s.  
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Figure 7.2 
 
 
Country 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Belgium 8590 8457 8297 8180 6717 6378 6343 6214 6097 6020 6018
Canada 19352 19254 19236 17766 17569 17525 17271 16278 14948 13775 14251
Denmark 4830 4710 4714 4799 4711 4724 4605 4556 4571 4629 4680
France 69001 69847 69538 69991 67789 67038 67382 64047 62510 62725 61091
Germany 69498 69308 73042 67596 64288 57793 53898 53011 51977 50087 50248
Greece* 7159 6713 6787 6437 6689 6529 6641 6784 7190 7661 8349
Iceland n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Italy 37955 38254 36794 37313 36240 36434 35533 32452 35770 37506 38744
Luxembourg 188 172 179 198 206 188 207 202 209 225 242
Netherlands 13968 14100 13703 13321 13245 12172 11738 11404 11470 11350 11309
Norway 5325 5466 5511 5344 5791 5397 5674 5125 5195 5108 5446
Portugal 3571 3748 3853 3972 4078 3948 3841 4125 3977 4064 3974
Spain 19444 19340 19618 18854 18392 17921 18106 18250 17674 17501 18367
Turkey 9163 10602 12811 13169 13852 15315 14973 15382 17221 17942 18800
UK 64010 64574 64666 65413 61097 58306 56702 53183 52865 51200 51485
USA 586731 580705 554742 487221 514822 487764 460072 433220 409656 407537 398332
Total 918784 915249 893489 819571 835486 797431 762988 724233 701329 697332.1 691336.9
Table 7.2 Defense Spending by NATO Member State (2014 U.S. Millions)
*SIPRI	Estimated	Values
Source:	SIPRI
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  The sharp decline in defense spending on the part of NATO member states in the 
mid 1990s supports the idea that the United States and allies would have been either 
reluctant or unable to undertake large-scale military projects unilaterally. This, coupled 
with the rise in fixed costs for technologically advanced weapons systems, particularly 
for fifth-generation aircraft, would have given states increased incentive to collaborate in 
order to meet their respective security needs. However, quantitative data alone does not 
adequately demonstrate this connection, since the development of international arms 
collaboration is too recent to provide substantive data analysis on the subject. 
 
Rising International Arms Collaboration 
 
Altogether, the pressure on the U.S. government to adapt new defense policies to 
the changed geopolitical environment necessitated the exploration of new strategies of 
defense acquisition, especially when it came to alliances like NATO, which would 
continue to be influential despite the disappearance of its key adversary.81 Many of the 
proposed and attempted strategies have involved some form of international arms 
cooperation. While IAC had existed well before the end of the Cold War, it was usually 
the result of ad-hoc cooperation, whereas new IAC of the late 1980s and 1990s was done 
under more formalized bilateral and multilateral agreements.82 U.S. IAC during the Cold 
War consisted mostly of licensed production agreements with NATO allies as well as 
                                                 
81 See Celeste A. Wallander. 2000. "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War." 
International Organization 54 (4): 705-735. 
82 Richard A. Bitzinger. "The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge." 
International Security (The MIT Press) 19, no. 2 (1994): 170-171. 
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Japan and South Korea, which allowed allies to indigenously manufacture American-
designed weapons systems such as the F-104 fighter, M-60 tank, and Sidewinder air-to-
air missile.83  
 The more recent IAC strategies, corresponding with the end of the Cold War, 
have been coproduction and codevelopment, which further divides development and 
production responsibility to countries outside of the original “host.” In theory, these IAC 
strategies reduce overall costs to all involved states by collaborating on expensive 
research and development and achieving economies of scale through longer supply 
runs.84 In the context of diminished threat level and rising upfront costs for the latest 
weapons systems, it seems reasonable to expect the number of U.S. IAC projects to 
continue to rise, especially given the growing influence of third-world defense 
production.85   
This hypothesis is indeed supported by data compiled by the Defense Budget 
Project, which shows a significant increase in the number of collaborative arms 
agreements between developed states and developing states as well as with each other. 
Specifically, the number of such agreements involving U.S. and NATO allies increased 
to unprecedented levels over latter half of the twentieth century. Between 1961 and 1980 
there were 65 formal codevelopment or coproduction weapons programs involving 
                                                 
83 Ibid, 176-177. 
84 Brooks 2005, 83. 
85 Richard A. Bitzinger. "The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge." 
International Security (The MIT Press) 19, no. 2 (1994): 177. 
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NATO states. Between 1981 and 1995, the number of such arrangements grew to 439.86 
Figure 7.3 demonstrates this trend.  
 
Figure 7.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 There does appear to be correlation between decline in NATO defense spending 
and increase in international arms collaboration. Furthermore, the same period of time 
saw significant proliferation of advanced technology with military applications, giving 
more states sufficient industrial capacity to develop their own defense industries. This 
would have created an increased incentive for these states to lobby for arms agreements 
                                                 
86 Richard A. Bitzinger, DBP Globalization Database 
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that would have allowed access to technology held by established arms producers. 
However, the limited data alone cannot provide a full assessment. In the case study, I will 
address the rationale of both large and small states in asymmetric alliances engaging in 
international arms collaboration.   
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8. Case Study: The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
 
The F-35 is an ideal case for analysis because the project represents a clear 
departure from the long-established strategy of autonomous or near-autonomous arms 
production. While collaborative efforts on aircraft between allies had taken place before, 
no case approaches the Joint Strike Fighter’s financial cost or number of participating 
states. It also contradicts the conventional wisdom that suggests that states prefer 
indigenous arms production. Indeed, U.S. arms production since World War II is best 
characterized as highly autonomous, utilizing domestic industrial capacity and 
government investment to produce cutting-edge arms for U.S. military forces and export 
to allies such as members of NATO.87 However, with the end of the Cold War and 
reductions in military spending that came with it, the United States could no longer 
support such as massive defense industrial base. In addition, increased industry 
competition from Western European allies that had begun to grow in the 1970s as a result 
of state sponsored enterprises and heavy subsidization now presented a significant threat 
to U.S. control of the arms market.88 Both of these factors – reduction in defense budgets 
and increase in foreign competition – contributed to the creation of the Joint Strike 
Fighter, and by extension, a fundamental change in U.S. arms acquisition strategy.  
Since World War II, the U.S. has produced its weapons indigenously, utilizing its 
massive industrial base to produce cutting-edge weapons systems. In addition to 
                                                 
87 Taylor, Phillip. "Weapons Standardization in NATO: Collaborative Security or Economic 
Competition?" International Organization 36, no. 1 (1982): 99. 
88 Ibid, 99-100. 
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bolstering economic growth, this policy was ideal from a classical realist perspective. 
That is, states value an autonomous defense industrial base that is able to produce arms 
independent of exterior providers because it gives states a level of control over the 
production of arms and limits vulnerability to supply cutoffs in times of crisis.89 As an 
added benefit, large states with significant defense industries are in a better position to 
remain in the cutting-edge of weapons technology due to the scale of financial inputs and 
a sizable domestic market.90 Post-World War II, the United States became the dominant 
provider of arms to its allies, transferring the latest tanks, air defense systems, missiles, 
and aircraft to deter Soviet aggression.91 Once the Soviet threat disappeared, so did the 
need to mass produce advanced weapon systems for domestic and allied consumption. 
The United States was no longer willing to maintain near-wartime level military 
spending. Therefore, the development of the Joint Strike Fighter program supports my 
first hypothesis about the negative relationship between military spending and 
international collaboration. The F-35 constituted a pragmatic approach to arms 
production, emphasizing cost reductions at the expense of industrial autonomy.  
 
Effect of Rising Technology Costs 
 
 
                                                 
89 Ethan B. Kapstein. "International Collaboration in Armaments Production: A Second-Best 
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While decreased budgets provide incentive to cut costs, austerity alone cannot 
adequately explain the case of the Joint Strike Fighter. There had been several instances 
of decreased defense budgets throughout the Cold War, some more severe than those of 
the 1990s, which did not result in extensive codevelopment programs. What other factors 
could be influencing U.S. arms production strategy? Unlike previous reductions in 
defense spending, the 1990s defense cuts coincided with a significant increase in 
advanced technological inputs for new weapons systems, particularly aircraft. As a result, 
fixed costs in the technology-intensive research and development phase of production 
now represented almost fifty percent of a total weapons systems costs, compared to only 
five percent in the 1950s.92 This increased financial burden for the production of 
advanced weapons systems, coupled with reduced military spending, increased pressure 
on the United States to find new ways to minimize costs to maintain its defense 
capabilities heading into an uncertain twenty-first century.  
In Congress, the consensus was in favor of cutting programs meant to produce 
replacements for aging fleets of aircraft. From a realist perspective, this entailed 
jeopardizing U.S. military capabilities in the long-term, which could have serious 
ramifications for security, something that was of grave concern to senior members in the 
Armed Services Committee during the FY1994 budget debates.93 In an effort to fund 
initial research for eventual replacement aircraft programs, the Clinton Administration 
and Congress agreed to merge the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF) and 
                                                 
92 Ethan B. Kapstein. "International Collaboration in Armaments Production: A Second-Best 
Solution." Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 4 (1991): 668. 
93 "1993 SUMMARY OF MAJOR LEGISLATION DEFENSE and FOREIGN POLICY." CQ 
Weekly (December 11, 1993): 3399-406. 
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the Joint Advanced Strike Technology project (JAST) into a single program that became 
known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).94 The program’s White Paper published by the 
Department of Defense in 1996 emphasized cost effectiveness as JSF’s key feature: 
The focus of the program is affordability—reducing the development cost, 
production cost, and cost of ownership of the JSF family of aircraft. The program 
is accomplishing this by facilitating the Services’ development of fully validated, 
affordable operational requirements, and lowering risk by investing in and 
demonstrating key leveraging technologies and operational concepts prior to the 
start of Engineering and Manufacturing Development (E&MD) of the JSF.95 
 
At its core, the Joint Strike Fighter represented a means to develop next-
generation aircraft systems while keeping costs low. While the program emphasized 
cooperation between the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, it also emphasized an 
unprecedented level of internationalization early on in the initial design phase. The same 
document noted that the U.K.’s Royal Navy had invested $200 million dollars in the 
program and that “Foreign participation is expected to increase.”96 This signaled the 
beginning of a fundamental shift in American arms procurement strategy. For the first 
time, a major weapons system program was formed on the assumption of international 
collaboration in the earliest stages of development with the explicit expectation that more 
foreign governments would have the opportunity to join. While international 
collaboration between the United States and allies, particularly in Western Europe, had 
been emphasized as a foundational goal of the alliance, efforts to codevelop advanced 
weapons systems such as aircraft only resulted in agreements that divided economic 
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offsets across participants in the form of licensed production rather than sustained 
partnerships.97 However, rising pressure to cut military spending across the Western 
allies and high fixed costs put the Joint Strike Fighter in a position to succeed as both a 
cost-saving measure and improvement of alliance cohesion.  
 
Technology Diffusion and Increased Competition 
 
The 1970s and 1980s saw increased internationalization of the global arms 
industry, causing a widespread diffusion of dual-use technologies that helped to jumpstart 
defense production capacity in states that had previously been primary importers of 
foreign-made weapons systems.98 Though defense industries had been slow to 
internationalize, civilian producers of advanced technological inputs in industries such as 
aerospace, microelectronics, computer software, and telecommunications, were now 
taking the lead in developing cutting-edge dual-use technologies. Because firms that 
produced these inputs were part of complex global supply chains, industrial expertise and 
capacity quickly diffused to more states, including many that had previously been 
significant importers of arms.99 By the late 1980s the internationalization of dual-use 
technologies was the subject of several U.S. government studies that found there was 
significant reliance on foreign sources for many of the military’s most advanced weapons 
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systems, which alarmed holders of more traditional realist views.100 What did this 
development mean for U.S. post-Cold War strategy? If the United States was facing both 
decreased defense budgets and increased foreign competition, then there was a significant 
risk of losing global arms market influence, even among allied states, who were now in a 
position to take a realist approach and increase defense industry autonomy. As a result, a 
U.S. alliance arming strategy based on off-the-shelf exports would no longer be feasible, 
as former arms importers now had a legitimate and indigenous alternative to American 
weaponry.  
The Department of Defense’s International Security Handbook acknowledges 
falling military spending as well as high technology costs as contributing to the trend of 
arms internationalization, “Reductions in the defense budgets of the United States and 
NATO nations, and in other allied and friendly nations, coupled with the high cost of 
weapons systems has resulted in more international cooperation on the development of 
weapons systems. This trend is expected to continue.”101 Given this assessment, the Joint 
Strike Fighter became an international endeavor, with eight partner states contributing to 
the system development and demonstration phase of the project.102  
 
                                                 
100 See Roderick Vawter. 1986. U.S. Industrial Base Dependence/Vulnerability, Phase 1: Survey of 
Literature. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University. 4; Department of Defense (DoD). 1988. 
Bolstering Defense Industrial Competitiveness: Preserving Our Heritage, Securing Our Future. 
Washington, D.C.: Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition), 
July. 155-157, 192. 
101 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). 2009. "Chapter 2: Types of International Programs." In 
International Programs Security Handbook, 20. Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy Support. 
102 Srdjan Vucetic and Kim Richard Nossal. "The International Politics of the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter." International Journal 68, no. 1 (2012): 6. 
  46 
Partner State Preferences and the Joint Strike Fighter 
 
 The Joint Strike Fighter program’s eight “partner” states earned this designation 
through their financial investment in the early stages of development. Most of these states 
were European and members of NATO, including the United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, 
and the Netherlands. To reiterate my hypothesis, small states will choose international 
arms collaboration if they can access foreign technology and stimulate their domestic 
industries. As established by realist literature, these states prefer to produce their own 
arms rather than depend on a foreign state, even if the foreign state is an ally, such as the 
United States. Given this premise, the fact that NATO states imported most of their 
armaments from the United States during the early decades of the Cold War speaks to the 
inability of these states to support and maintain the domestic industrial capacity necessary 
to produce their own cutting-edge weapons systems. This calculus began to change as 
technological expertise began to diffuse across the global arms industry in the 1970s and 
1980s.103 By the 1990s, Western European NATO states were combining their resources 
to develop and produce their own jet fighters, such as the Gripen, Rafale, and 
Eurofighter.104 As a result, these states were now able to feasibly purse their preferred 
method of arms acquisition.  
 While realist theory tells us that states will always prefer indigenously produced 
arms over imports, European states Italy, Norway, and the United Kingdom still elected 
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to participate the American Joint Strike Fighter, even though indigenous European 
alternatives were available. This departure from expected policy signifies an additional 
underlying factor contributing to these states’ decision-making. In other words, these 
states see value in participating in the Joint Strike Fighter that outweighs the benefits of 
acquiring domestic fighter aircraft. While what exactly constitutes this value is unclear, 
there are a few potential motivations driving this seemingly anomalous policy. First, 
states view U.S. weapons as continuing to set the standard for cutting-edge weaponry. 
Even though European states can produce suitable alternatives, they ultimately may not 
adequately or cost-effectively perform the various roles assigned to then as their 
American counterparts. For example, the Italian military chose the F-35 to replace several 
of its aging carrier-based aircraft because it was designed as a multi-role aircraft, serving 
the roles of surveillance, close air support, and suppression of enemy air defenses, while 
the Eurofighter was designed mainly as an air defense aircraft.105 Norway’s Ministry of 
Defence cited the F-35’s high-tech stealth features as the deciding factor in their fighter 
competition.106 
 Second, states see strategic benefits in obtaining arms from the United States. It 
has long been a goal of NATO to standardize weapons systems across alliance members 
in order to ensure interoperability and effectiveness as a counter to the Warsaw Pact.107 
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However, attempts to do so were always undermined by state preferences rooted in realist 
theory. Yet Norway saw strategic advantages in choosing the F-35 over a European, and 
likely cheaper, alternative. A report published by the Norwegian Defence Ministry 
highlighted the key strategic factors to be emphasized in the fighter decision-making 
process, including alliance cohesion and increased cooperation with “large allies” 
fielding the same weapons systems.108 The report concluded that “it is important for 
Norway to position itself within the Alliance via close collaboration with selected close 
allies, in order for [Norway’s] assessments and priorities to be noted. In a more 
heterogeneous NATO a good bilateral relationship to the United States is at least as 
important as before.”109 Strategic considerations also played a role in Italy’s decision to 
join the Joint Strike Fighter program. While Italy values its domestic industrial base, it is 
also aware of its volatile geographic position between unstable regions in North Africa 
and the Balkans. Historically, this reality has prompted Italy to establish alliances with 
stronger powers. Yet this is also rooted in realist theory in the form of balance of power 
theory.110 With respect to the Joint Strike Fighter, Italy views its participation in the 
program as essential for strengthening its relationship with the United States during an 
uncertain security environment that has persisted since the fall of the Soviet Union.111  
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 Finally, the most frequently cited rationale for Joint Strike Fighter participation is 
economic. As democracies, NATO states need to consider the implications of defense 
policy for their citizens and voters. The constriction of defense budgets, as established in 
the data analysis section, had a devastating effect on the domestic industries of all NATO 
allies, but especially those in Western Europe.112 As a result, states needed to focus their 
attention on preserving domestic employment through defense-related industries.113 This 
fact, coupled with rising European capability due to technology diffusion, caused states to 
turn away from their traditional arms acquisition methods, namely, importing weapons 
systems from the United States. Had this trend continued, it could have eventually 
diminished U.S. influence over the European arms market, an outcome unacceptable to 
American defense policymakers.  
 
Leading State Preferences  
 
 As stated earlier in this paper, the United States, and leaders of asymmetric 
alliances in general, have a preference for producing arms indigenously and exporting 
these weapons systems to dependent allied states.114 Yet, the circumstances that propelled 
the creation of the Joint Strike Fighter program were not conducive towards this 
conventional realist approach. To reiterate my final hypothesis, while large states in such 
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alliances always prefer to export arms “off-the-shelf,” they will participate in 
international collaboration if domestic military spending is low and competition from 
foreign states is high. This policy reflects a “second-best” solution as the United States is 
forced to acquiesce to the demands of its less powerful allies in collaborative 
agreements.115  
 One of the main reasons the United States is hesitant to engage in coproduction or 
codevelopment agreements with allies is the issue of technology transfer and diffusion. 
The United States has always been protective of its intellectual property, especially when 
concerning design and production of state-of-the-art weapons systems. This concern was 
highlighted in the 1980s when Israel secretly re-exported American technology to China. 
This technology had been transferred to Israel as part of the U.S.-Israeli Lavi fighter 
program.116 Such risks of transfer of sensitive U.S. technology to third parties via allied 
states led U.S. policymakers to take strict measures against international collaboration, 
such as enacting the Obey Amendment, which banned the foreign sale of the F-22 Raptor 
to any foreign government as of 1998, and is still in effect today.117 
 What implications did such a strict policy have on the Joint Strike Fighter, a 
program that emphasized the joint development of advanced stealth technology for a 
fifth-generation fighter jet? Many experts within the United States were very dubious 
about the prospect of sharing too much expertise with so many foreign governments. A 
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1994 report published by the Defense Science Board warned policymakers that 
coproduction and codevelopment agreements for the Joint Strike Fighter should be 
avoided due to the risk of losing technological advantages and that the United States 
should instead design an “export-only” variant of the new jet that would minimize such 
risks.118 Despite this warning, the JSF program continued to involve foreign states, 
offering incentives of technology transfer and economic offsets to convince governments 
to commit to the F-35.  
 To understand why the United States chose to pursue the JSF program while 
understanding the potential negative consequences of technology transfer, I return to my 
hypothesis. First, defense spending was falling throughout the 1990s and plans to upgrade 
aging fleets of tactical aircraft came under constant threat of cancellation from 
Congress.119 Second, the natural diffusion of technology that had occurred in the previous 
decade through the globalization of dual-use industries allowed European countries to 
build up and sustain their own production of military hardware. Because the threat of 
losing market share in Europe to a purely European arms production, U.S. policymakers 
realized that they could no longer afford to take a pure realist stance on arms production 
and transfers. Losing the European market to European defense industry would have had 
a devastating effect on the United States’ arms industry, which was already struggling to 
adjust to lowering domestic demand.  
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 Ultimately, the Joint Strike Fighter program is an attempt by the United States to 
maintain its market share with its allies. Since the United States is no longer able to 
pursue its preferred policy of exporting American arms to allies, U.S. policymakers 
instead created a weapons program that they were willing to share to other states in order 
to prevent them from turning to their growing indigenous capabilities. This remains in 
line with realist theory, which argues that international collaboration is indeed a “second-
best” solution.120 The two key offsets offered to participating partner states come in the 
form of technology transfer and coproduction agreements. The number of units that each 
partner state is allowed to produce under the agreement is commensurate with each 
state’s financial investment and purchasing commitment. For example, the United 
Kingdom, a Level I partner, has contributed over 6% of the financial costs of the program 
and will ultimately indigenously produce 150 units, or just under 5% of all F-35 units.121 
 With respect to technology transfers, several partner states have expressed 
disappointment and have even threatened to withdraw from the program completely. 
Lockheed Martin, the F-35’s largest contractor, had been charged with the task of 
distributing workload across the partner states, a task Lockheed was both unprepared and 
unwilling to do.122 In addition, the United States has refused to share certain technologies 
such as software code with the United Kingdom, adding mistrust and animosity to what 
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was to be an alliance-promoting collaboration.123 Other countries dissatisfied with their 
shares of work include Canada, Italy, and Turkey, who have each threatened to exit the 
program.124  
 The unequal distribution of work and limited sharing of technology has prompted 
critics to accuse the United States of utilizing a “Trojan horse” strategy to maintain its 
control over the European arms market.125 In other words, the United States, unable to 
sell its arms to states with now viable alternatives, provides economic and technological 
incentives to participate in an American-led “international” weapons program, only to 
find themselves both at the mercy of the F-35’s consistent cost overruns and the United 
States’ strict limits on technology transfer. While this strategy may maintain the United 
States’ presence in the markets of its European allies, it remains uncertain whether future 
collaborative endeavors will have any support.  
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9. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
While the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is often considered an anomalous arms 
program given traditional realist preferences, the analysis in this paper lends support to 
the idea that the program does indeed fit within established norms of realist theory. Both 
large states (U.S.) and small states (NATO allies) elected to participate in the Joint Strike 
Fighter program as a means to preserve and bolster their respective industrial capacities. 
The United States did so to prevent itself from being locked out of an increasingly 
competitive European market while U.S. allies were looking to gain American 
technological expertise, stimulate their domestic industries through coproduction, and 
eventually utilize their newfound knowledge to further increase the competitiveness of 
their arms production capacities to eventually outpace the United States.  
Thus far, the United States appears to be gaining more from this strategy. By 
committing eight states to procure a fifth-generation American fighter, the United States 
ensures that the European market will remain firmly within U.S. control for the 
foreseeable future. This objective is aided further by stringent controls over advanced 
technologies.  
Because this research is exploratory in nature, it would be inappropriate to draw 
general conclusions about the future of international arms collaboration. Future quantitate 
analysis may compare the Joint Strike Fighter to other collaborative arms programs if the 
number of such programs continues to significantly grow. While this analysis supports a 
new form of realist application in arms acquisition, more research is needed on the 
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subject of collaborative arms, which is still a relatively novel practice in international 
relations. As a result, the question as to whether or not the Joint Strike Fighter marks the 
end of arms autonomy cannot yet be answered. For now, the United States must be more 
mindful of the demands and expectations of its partners. While protection of sensitive 
international property reflects sound realist policy in the short-term, it may reduce 
prospects for future collaborative arms projects with allies, especially as globalization 
continues to alter the global conventional arms industry. 
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